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In many ways the Bush administration's "war on terror" weakened states' respect for their human 
rights obligations, and the UN Security Council's initial response to 9/11 seemed to follow the 
Bush administration's lead.  In keeping with its historical lack of engagement with human rights 
questions, the SC in 2001-2003 did little to ensure that the counter-terrorism measures it 
demanded of states would take their obligations under human rights and humanitarian law into 
account.  However, starting in 2002, a backlash against the perceived excesses wrought by the 
SC’s counter-terrorism measures gained momentum.  Other UN bodies, as well as NGOs, 
regional intergovernmental institutions, and national and international courts increasingly 
asserted that human rights and security are mutually reinforcing.  The emerging norm of mutual 
reinforcement gradually began to be institutionalized by the SC, which over time directed its 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (established Oct., 2001) to incorporate human rights concerns 
more robustly into its monitoring regime, country visits, technical assistance, and 
communications. This paper analyzes three stages in the development of CTC's human rights 
program:  Talking, First Steps, and (perhaps) Walking.  It analyzes the incorporation of human 
rights into CTC’s Preliminary Implementation Assessment matrix, a document that forms the 
basis of the committee’s work with individual states.  It also documents the development of the 
committee's joint work with other UN human rights bodies, donor states, and NGOs.  CTC's 
work with states is rooted in dialogue rather than sanctions, and relies on confidentiality rather 
than transparency. Yet even this relatively weak form of engagement with human rights is a 
rather impressive change from the past. The paper asserts that the SC's evolving approach to 
counter-terrorism has bound the UN's security and human rights missions more closely together 
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A Sea Change in Security:  How the ‘War on Terror’ Strengthened Human Rights 
 
Overview 
After 9/11, the Bush administration attempted to drive a wedge between counter-
terrorism and human rights.  The administration argued that rights like freedom of speech and 
movement, due process, privacy, protection from search and seizure, and limits on detention and 
interrogation made terrorists’ jobs easier.  The administration brought pressure to bear on the 
United Nations Security Council, essentially, to internationalize the USA PATRIOT Act.1  While 
the administration’s approach was hard-line, the logic behind it was not new; in fact, the 
separation between security issues and human rights issues was embedded in the structure of the 
United Nations, where military questions have historically been located in the Security Council 
and human rights questions in various Charter and treaty bodies.    The institutional structure 
reflected the notion that war and other states of emergency, like the fight against global 
terrorism, are governed by one set of laws and procedures, peace and human rights by another.   
Yet, in response to the global “war on terror,” this structure has come to seem 
increasingly outdated, and a new norm is evolving that sees human rights and security as 
inextricably intertwined.  The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, in its “Digest 
of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights 
While Countering Terrorism” (2003), concluded that a consensus was emerging that human 
rights law and humanitarian law share a “common nucleus of non-derogable rights and common 
purpose of promoting human life and dignity.”2  This is not to say that the new norm was 
accepted everywhere.  The creation, and especially the institutionalization, of new norms are 
generally gradual and political processes, and even more so in this case because the stakes are so 
high.  The transformation traced here is not a completed transition and probably will not be for a 
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generation.  Nevertheless, this new norm has catalyzed the beginnings of change in the UN’s 
institutional structure. 
A month after 9/11, at the urging of the United States, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1373, drawing on its Chapter VII powers to establish a new Committee on Counter-
Terrorism with a sweeping mandate to ensure that states implement counter-terrorism measures.3  
The resolution reinforced the separation between security and human rights:  it mandated that 
states cooperate with each other in the fight against terrorism but, except for one minor reference 
to asylum, did not specify that in doing so they must respect their human rights obligations in 
international law.  This in itself might not have been so significant given that states’ obligations 
to human rights are guaranteed by treaty and custom, but because the resolution presupposed an 
international state of emergency, states could reasonably interpret the omission as permission to 
derogate from human rights in the pursuit of suspected terrorists.  And many did.   
It was all the more significant because, in many commentators’ eyes, 1373 was a 
watershed resolution that, for the first time, made the Security Council a “global legislator.”4  In 
2002, CTC’s first chair, UK Permanent Representative to the UN Jeremy Greenstock, made the 
separation explicit, asserting that human rights monitoring was “outside the scope” of CTC’s 
mandate and best left to human rights organs within the UN.5  These comments support Kim 
Lane Scheppele’s contention that, after 9/11, the first wave of global public law—human rights 
law—gave way to a second wave of security law based on the idea of a permanent "international 
state of emergency” in which, it was thought, certain human rights obligations could be ignored.6  
These included the prohibition on torture and arbitrary detention, protection from non-
refoulement, due process rights, free speech, and a host of others. 
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In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that the globalization of counter-terrorism law 
between Oct. 2001 and early 2003 enabled executives in many states to aggrandize power and 
use the proclaimed state of emergency as a pretext for passing “exception laws,” i.e., counter-
terrorism laws that reclassified as terrorists groups that were in fact merely political opponents or 
minorities.7  Indeed, Judge Richard Goldstone and others have shown that a number of other 
states—the UK, India, Russia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia and 
Indonesia—have already cited US behavior as precedent for exception laws restricting or 
suspending human rights law for detainees.8  These developments have implications larger than 
the fates of the individuals involved:  the legitimacy of both international human rights and 
humanitarian law is at stake.  As Goldstone put it of humanitarian law, “What is of particular 
concern is that this violation of international law…might well weaken the Geneva Conventions 
and be used to justify similar violations by other countries.”9  Each exception law risks 
contributing to the establishment of new, less restrictive state custom.10 
This early situation was fluid, however.  Starting in 2002, a backlash against the 
perceived excesses wrought by counter-terrorism measures gained momentum.  Evidence piled 
up that, contrary to the notion that the easing of human rights constraints helps states prosecute 
the war on terror, abuses by states are a “powerful predictor of subsequent terrorist attacks,” 
especially if the rights abused involve physical integrity, like the prohibition of extrajudicial 
killing, disappearances, torture, and prolonged detention.11  In late 2002, numerous actors at the 
UN called for changes in CTC’s 1373 regime so that it would systematically monitor states’ 
compliance with their human rights obligations while countering terrorism.12  In an address to 
the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that “while we certainly need 
vigilance to prevent acts of terrorism, and firmness in condemning and punishing them, it will be 
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self-defeating if we sacrifice other key priorities — such as human rights — in the process.”  
Recognizing that “the protection of human rights is not primarily the responsibility of the 
Council — it belongs to other United Nations bodies, whose work the Council does not need to 
duplicate,” he nonetheless maintained that “there is a need to take into account the expertise of 
those bodies and to make sure that the measures the Council adopts do not unduly curtail human 
rights or give others a pretext to do so.”13   
In response, CTC Chair Greenstock reiterated that human rights monitoring was outside 
the scope of the committee’s mandate.  He expressed the concerns of many of the permanent 
member states (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia), which were committed 
to fighting terrorism without being hampered by undue concern for habeas corpus, limits on 
detention, and restrictions on torture and surveillance, despite that derogation from many of these 
rights was prohibited under any circumstances by human rights law, humanitarian law, and 
customary international law. 
Nonetheless, other UN bodies joined the Secretary-General in calling for greater 
coordination.  The General Assembly affirmed, in a 2002 resolution by Mexico, the importance 
of respecting human rights while countering terrorism.14  Mary Robinson, then the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, urged CTC to incorporate respect for human rights into its 
technical assistance, and her office published a “Digest of Jurisprudence” relating to human 
rights and terrorism.  Sir Nigel Rodley, Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Committee (overseeing 
the ICCPR), argued that CTC could not just leave human rights to treaty bodies because these 
were too easily manipulated and their decisions would not carry the weight of Security Council 
decisions under Chapter VII Charter provisions. Besides, he pointed out, his committee could 
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only deal with 15 state reports per year.15  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and 
UNESCO also threw their weight behind the new norm. 
Outside pressure was exerted by NGOs, and regional intergovernmental institutions.  
Both Human Rights Watch and the European Commission for Democracy through Law issued 
reports documenting the use of 1373 by states to justify human rights abuses and urged the 
Commission on Human Rights to do more to prevent this.16  The International Law Commission 
published its Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, urging 
states to respect human rights during their responses to terrorist acts.17  The Council of Europe, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the African Union, and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe promoted the mutually enforcing nature of human rights and 
counter-terrorism and limited such practices as incommunicado detention and torture.18 
National, regional and international courts joined in supporting the creation of the new 
norm.  The OHCHR’s “Digest” cited numerous opinions by the European Court of Human 
Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and various national courts limiting 
permissible derogations from human rights law in counter-terrorism.19  Inter-American and 
African Union regional invoked the articles in their charters protecting human rights from 
derogation during armed hostilities and public emergencies.   The International Court of Justice, 
in its advisory opinions related to Israel’s construction of a wall in the occupied territories and to 
the armed conflicts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reiterated the relevance of 
human rights in armed conflict.20   
Human rights advocates also argued that the International Criminal Court’s enabling 
statute amalgamates human rights and humanitarian law in many areas, limiting derogation even 
during armed conflict or states of emergency.21  Counter-terrorism officials and personnel could 
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be liable for crimes against humanity under the statute if they systematically tortured suspected 
terrorists, persecuted them as part of an ethnic or national group, or arbitrarily detained them.  
They could be liable for war crimes—assuming the court determined that the “war on terror” 
was, in fact, an armed conflict governed by its statute—for depriving suspected terrorists of 
POW status, torturing detainees or subjecting them to humiliating or degrading treatment, 
detaining them unlawfully, depriving them of fair trial rights and habeas corpus before a 
regularly constituted court, or unlawfully deporting them. 22   
This article will demonstrate that, over time, as evidence spread of an emerging 
consensus that counter-terrorism and human rights are mutually reinforcing, it became routine 
practice for UN actors to proclaim that a state’s human rights compliance made its counter-
terrorism efforts more effective, not less.  These reiterations of the new norm constituted a strong 
collective rebuke to the practice of those states, many of them Western powers, that had followed 
the US lead. 
In response to this cultural shift, the Security Council gradually gave CTC more leeway 
to incorporate human rights concerns in its monitoring regime, joint work with other human 
rights bodies, country visits, technical assistance, and communications.  Overall, I discern three 
discrete stages in the gradual development of CTC’s practice with respect to human rights 
between 2003 and the present:  Talking, First Steps, and (perhaps) Walking.  This trajectory has 
led to a rather startling new situation.  While the Security Council had earlier expressed concern 
for human rights in extreme circumstances (e.g., in resolutions on South African apartheid and 
Soviet repression), through CTC, the Security Council, for the first time in its history, has given 
to human rights the stature of a binding Chapter VII imperative.23 
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The issue of human rights in counter-terrorism was the catalyst for a larger shift in 
thinking about the relation between human rights and security more generally, which has had an 
impact on debates about other arenas, such as sexual violence against women and children 
during armed conflict, or the crackdown on free speech by dictators during the Arab Spring.24  
Through its actions with respect to counter-terrorism, the Security Council has made human 
rights a legitimate, ongoing object of concern in its chamber.   
 
Stage 1 (2003-2006):  Talking 
 Quick transformations in the observance of emerging international norms are rare 
because of the complexity of multilateral negotiations, the clashing of divergent national 
interests, and institutional inertia.  Shifts tend to require painstakingly small steps enacted 
through the most mundane institutional processes:  committee meetings, work programmes, 
speeches, funding requests, and the like.  Where human rights in counter-terrorism is concerned, 
the small steps have begun to add up to a greater movement, but in order to understand that 
movement, especially where there are so many actors pursuing so many different agendas, one 
must observe carefully a myriad of moving parts and establish their interrelations. 
The first stage in the development of human rights awareness in counter-terrorism efforts 
involved a change in the way UN actors talked about it.25  Between 2003 and 2006, across a wide 
range of UN agencies, the language of official statements and resolutions moved from the 
conventional wisdom that human rights and counter-terrorism are mutually exclusive to the 
conclusion that they are “mutually reinforcing.”26  The first step was to insert human rights 
retroactively into the mandate covered by 1373, which the Security Council did in several 
resolutions between 2003 and 2005.  In January, 2003, in Res. 1456, the Council for the first 
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time asserted that “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with 
all their obligations under international law,…in particular international human rights, refugee, 
and humanitarian law.”  This language has become routine boilerplate in every resolution since.  
In this case, however, the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, so it did 
not become part of 1373’s mandate.27  
The language might have remained pro forma, but in 2004, CTC began to consider how 
to incorporate human rights awareness into its practice.  First, in March, the Security Council 
passed Res. 1535, forming an executing authority—the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (CTED)—to advise CTC of how best to implement Res. 1373.28  CTED was directed 
to compile information on individual states’ compliance, prepare CTC for country visits, and 
provide technical assistance to states.  The resolution created a new team of experts to monitor 
implementation, the Assessment and Technical Assistance Office, and, significantly, established 
a staff position for a senior human rights officer.  The latter was the first human rights expert 
ever appointed to a position in the Security Council.  The new officer was tasked with 
contributing information on state assessments, briefing CTED’s executive director in preparation 
for state visits, helping draft reports and communications, and reporting on human rights issues 
to all CTED groups.   
Still, CTED’s first executive director, Javier Ruperez, remarked that “protection of 
human rights cannot be construed as a priority of the CTC.”29  Only a year later, however, 
CTED’s Work Program did mention this emphasis, albeit briefly and gingerly:  “CTED will 
advise CTC and follow its policy guidance with respect to the ways and situations in which a 
human rights perspective might be appropriately incorporated into its substantive work.”30  This 
is cautious bureaucratic language for “I don’t want to say this too loudly or I might lose my job.” 
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The next step came as a response to the London train bombings of September, 2005.  The 
Security Council passed the groundbreaking Res. 1624, focusing on incitement to terrorist acts.  
This resolution brought counter-terrorism and human rights closer than they had ever been.  In its 
preambular paragraphs, 1624 not only included the boilerplate language, but also made specific 
reference to the need to protect freedom of expression and refugees and prohibit states from 
repatriating refugees to countries that torture.  Moreover, for the first time in a resolution, it 
included an operative paragraph requiring that states respect their human rights obligations in 
relation to all aspects of counter-terrorism as outlined by 1373.31  By placing this requirement in 
an operative clause, the Security Council obligated states to conform their practices to their 
platitudes.  Finally, the resolution charged CTC to consider economic, cultural, and social rights 
that were often threatened in the fight against terrorism, and the abuse of which could in fact be 
conducive to terrorism.  The abuses mentioned specifically included religious and ethnic 
discrimination, poor economic development, and repression of civil society.  In other words 1624 
went beyond the established concern with civil and political rights to consider economic, social, 
and cultural rights.32   
Meanwhile, a wide range of other UN actors were already pressuring CTC in the area of 
human rights, or would come to do so:   
• The Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee 
• The Secretary-General 
• The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
• The Human Rights Council, and its Special Rapporteur on the protection and 
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism  
• Various human rights treaty bodies (ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT) 
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• The General Assembly’s United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force 
For example, on March 10, 2005 at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and 
Security in Madrid, Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his famous “5 D’s” speech identifying 
five “pillars” of what he termed a “principled, comprehensive strategy” to fight global terrorism.  
The fifth “D” was to “Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism,” recognizing that 
upholding human rights is, as Annan put it, “not merely compatible with a successful counter-
terrorism strategy.  It is an essential element of it.”  He continued, “Compromising human 
rights…facilitates achievement of the terrorist’s objective – by ceding him the moral high ground 
and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of the 
population where he is most likely to find recruits.”33  Annan’s speech was taken as a call for a 
rigorous and consistent approach to human rights in counter-terrorism throughout the UN 
system. 
The General Assembly responded to this call, and on September 20, 2006, passed a 
comprehensive resolution, the “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” which 
became the standard framework for all relevant actors throughout the UN system.34  The 
“Strategy” articulated what had become the new conventional wisdom—that terrorism is itself 
aimed at the destruction of human rights, that respect for human rights “is the fundamental basis 
for the fight against terrorism,” and that security and human rights are “interlinked and mutually 
reinforcing.”35   Moreover, in its Plan of Action, the GA echoed the Secretary-General in 
asserting that violations of human rights create conditions “conducive to terrorism” and it called 
for all UN bodies to “scale up” their cooperation and assistance to states on these issues.  In 
reaction against the US-led spread of exception laws, the “Strategy” called for the apprehension, 
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extradition, and prosecution of terrorist suspects under the rule of human rights law.36  To show 
it was serious, the General Assembly promised to strengthen its financial support to the Office of 
the High Commissioner of Human Rights for increasing field operations in this area.37   
The new Human Rights Council (having replaced the Human Rights Commission) acted 
as well, incorporating counter-terrorism concerns in the new mechanism it created for tracking 
states’ adherence to their obligations under international law:  the Universal Periodic Review.38  
Requiring states to report every four years, the UPR asked for states’ responses to questions 
about how their counter-terrorism measures complied with specific aspects of human rights 
law.39  The duplication of efforts with CTC is clear, and one could forgive states for complaining 
of reporting fatigue, but the UPR process now conformed to the broader UN Strategy.40 
The Security Council reacted to all the pressure from other UN and regional actors by 
issuing its standard-setting Policy Guidance for CTED of May, 2006.41  The Policy Guidance 
directed CTED to advise CTC as a matter of course on the human rights aspects of states’ 
counter-terrorism programs, as part of the ongoing dialogue with States on their implementation 
of 1373.  It guided CTED to provide detailed technical assistance on human rights compliance to 
states, to liaise with other human rights organizations inside and outside the UN and with civil 
society, and to incorporate human rights into its public communications strategy.  The Policy 
Guidance essentially required CTED to begin operationalizing its human rights responsibilities—
without, however, allocating any additional resources for it to do so. 
One obstacle was that, by 2005, CTC had piled up a substantial backlog of reports from 
states on their efforts to implement 1373.  Moreover, many states were failing or did not have the 
capacity to submit reports.  By the end of 2005 CTC had only managed to make ten country 
visits.  So, to streamline the reporting process and make standards and recommendations more 
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consistent, CTED in 2006 developed a new tool, the Preliminary Implementation Assessment 
(PIA).  Compiled from a wide range of sources, the PIA assessed, point by point, how states 
responded to each requirement in the three paragraphs of 1373.  As a CTED PowerPoint 
presentation explained, the PIA was intended to enable CTC to: 
• Make a targeted approach, 
• Focus more on implementation than reporting, 
• Ensure thorough, consistent, transparent and even-handed analysis for all Member States 
of the United Nations, 
• Use international standards, 
• Allow for a longer and flexible period of time for reporting while maintaining exchanges 
and dialogues with Member States, and 
• Provide a basis for a global assessment of counter-terrorism efforts.42 
Note that the PIA process was not backed by the threat of sanctions, and so was considered by 
many human rights organizations to lack teeth.  Still, this was the first time human rights 
concerns were incorporated in CTED’s practical assessments, and CTED claimed it would 
henceforth include human rights issues in its country visits.  Progress was slow, however; by 
December 2006 CTED had made only five more visits, which meant that most PIAs were 
completed without the hands-on information gathered by the visiting teams through their 
personal contacts with state officials, civil society members, and members of the military and 
judiciary.  CTED could visit only those states that agreed to host them, and could meet with only 
those officials permitted to talk with them.  By the end of 2006, CTED had completed only 42 of 
a promised 230 PIAs.  It was and remains difficult to gauge the extent to which the visits and 
PIAs impacted human rights outcomes, because, as international criminal law expert George 
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Andreopoulos pointed out, "only the country concerned is privy to the information included in 
the PIA.”43  It is not even clear whether, at this point, the PIAs and visits raised human rights 
issues at all. 
In this first stage of the trajectory we there were many resolutions about implementation 
and there was cross-talk and duplication among proliferating actors.  The PIA process 
represented embryonic but weak implementation.  As E. J. Flynn, CTED’s senior human rights 
officer, put it in an article reviewing this period, “the Security Council has increasingly accepted 
the link between upholding human rights and humanitarian law and maintaining international 
peace and security.  Yet in some areas, there remain strong currents of opinion holding that the 
human rights perspective should not unduly burden the Council’s agenda.  This has been the case 
with the Council’s work on counter-terrorism.”44 
 
Stage 2 (November, 2007- June 2008):  First Steps 
 In the second, relatively brief, stage, CTC and CTED began to review their efforts and 
confront obstacles to states’ implementation.  In December, 2007, the SC directed CTED to 
reorganize its work plan in order to enact the PIA process in earnest.45  In response, CTED 
created new subcommittees for reviewing PIAs consisting of three geographical clusters and five 
technical groups that cut across geographical zones.   The technical groups included those on 
technical assistance, terrorist financing, border security, arms trafficking and law enforcement, 
and last, the human rights aspects of counter-terrorism.  Mike Smith, who was appointed 
CTED’s executive director in November, 2007, called for a “harmonized approach to the 
assessment of human rights issues across all clusters.”46  CTED also revised communications and 
country visits to emphasize human rights.  Due to the increased efficiencies of the new work 
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plan, and with the aid of a new staff member, by the end of 2008, the CTED was able to finalize 
PIAs for all states.  It also began work on a “Survey of Implementation of SC Res. 1373 (2001).” 
The Survey would list a number of typical human rights developments in states’ counterterrorist 
activities, such as training programs for law enforcement in community policing.  
The duplication of efforts among UN actors continued, but there were more efforts at 
coordination.  On the one hand, in July, 2008, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) issued a fact sheet on human rights and counter-terrorism, which listed 
concerns virtually identical to those identified in CTED’s Survey of Implementation, although it 
did add concerns about due process, the independence of the judiciary, non-refoulement, and free 
speech.47  On the other hand, Martin Scheinin, the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur 
on counter-terrorism and human rights, issued a statement in Oct. 2008 citing clear progress in 
the linkages between CTC, CTED, and the HRC.48  The next month, the General Assembly 
formed a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, comprised of members of all the 
relevant UN agencies with the express mission of coordinating efforts throughout the system.  
The Task Force included a Working Group on Human Rights.  This coordination immediately 
produced something new.  The Working Group undertook its first country visit to Madagascar in 
2008.  In a presentation to experts on counterterrorism when it returned, the Working Group’s 
members argued that states’ obligations under the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, including the obligation to promote development, are crucial to the prevention of 
terrorism.  Indeed, they suggested “the need to reframe the notion of security to include 
[development issues].”49  This meant that CTED and the Task Force had moved from focusing 
merely on countering terrorism to preventing it. 
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 Still, obstacles continued:  as of 2008, no country visits had included a representative of a 
human rights body, not even the CTED’s own senior HR officer.50  How states reacted to the 
PIAs and other reports and visits remained vague outside of the committee, and details were few 
because the dialogue between CTC and individual states remained confidential. 
 
Stage 3 (June 2008-present):  Walking? 
In the final phase, from June 2008 until the present, the UN undertook substantial efforts 
to improve states’ implementation and UN actors’ coordination.  On October 29, 2009, in an 
address to CTC and CTED, Nevanethem Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
provided a useful overview of developments at CTC and CTED since the issuance of the 2006 
Policy Guidance, and she noted areas of remaining concern.  On the plus side, she pointed out 
that CTC and CTED had embraced the idea that countering terrorism while upholding human 
rights “creates a climate of trust between a State apparatus and those under its jurisdiction” and 
that “such trust is the very foundation of effective responses to global challenges, including 
terrorism.”  She noted that CTED’s human rights officer had begun to develop joint technical 
assistance with her office, to act as the liaison between CTED and the Human Rights Council’s 
Special Rapporteur, and to match underdeveloped states to donors engaged in capacity-building 
and rule-of-law activities.  She also noted that in the PIA process, CTC had been more willing to 
engage in dialogue about human rights concerns, as a result of which she indicated that other UN 
human rights bodies—including the treaty body monitoring compliance with the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights—had begun taking states’ reports to CTC seriously.  
Nevertheless, she noted a number of concrete areas for improvement.  She urged CTC to 
insist that states’ definitions of terrorism-related crimes be specific, so as to avoid ex-post-facto 
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law enforcement or retroactive criminalization of formerly legal activities.  She warned CTC of 
the negative consequences of national, ethnic, or religious profiling.  CTC, she said, should insist 
that states refrain from creating exceptional courts to deal with terrorism.  The committee should 
be vigilant in monitoring states’ restrictions on freedom of expression, in particular for civil 
society organizations.  It should insist on the protection of individuals’ privacy in the face of 
increased intelligence-gathering.  It should demand that states cease torture, ill-treatment, and 
rendition of detainees.  CTED should include the senior human rights officer on its country 
visits, and ask states specific questions in responses to their reports about human rights 
compliance.51 
Evidence shows that CTC took Pillay’s recommendations to heart.  In November, 2009, 
CTC’s chair, Ranko Vilović, briefed the Security Council, noting that all PIAs and country visits 
now raised human rights issues.  The next month CTED released its broad Survey of 
Implementation, which reported that “in virtually all regions there remain significant concerns 
that counter-terrorism measures…do not comply with those States’ obligations under 
international law.”  While citing many of the same concerns that the High Commissioner had 
brought to CTC’s attention, it added the continued use of extrajudicial executions, black sites, 
and refoulement.  Part of the problem was that states did not always grasp their responsibilities 
under the norm of mutual reinforcement.  A great leap forward was the publication of CTED’s 
Technical Guide to the Implementation of SC Res 1373 (2001).  The Technical Guide detailed 
how states should fulfill their human rights responsibilities in ten concrete areas of the PIA: 
• freezing of assets 
• regulation of charities 
• criminalization of assistance 
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• suppression of recruitment 
• prevention of conducive conditions  
• use of special investigative techniques and courts 
• denial of safe haven 
• precision of the definition of terrorism-related crimes 
• pre-trial detention rules 
• and extradition/non-refoulement.    
In addition, CTED published a Compilation of International Good Practices, Codes, and 
Standards, which presents models for state practice based on a wide variety of UN and regional 
treaties and codes, as well as INTERPOL manuals.52  Finally, CTED initiated a “stock-taking 
exercise” consisting of a follow-up review of the implementation of resolution 1373 two years 
after the PIA.53   The latter won praise from states for maintaining the dialogue and focusing it 
on implementation.  In all these ways, CTED made its interaction with states a recursive and 
ongoing process.   
 
A Parallel Case:  The Sanctions Committee 
The degree to which these changes reflected the will of the Security Council—and the 
continuing ambivalence its members felt toward the observance of human rights in counter-
terrorism—can be measured by reference to parallel developments in the work of another 
Security Council committee, the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (called the 
“Sanctions Committee” or “1267 Committee” after the SC resolution that created it).  This 
committee, created in 1999, focuses on the financing of terrorism.  In the aftermath of 9/11, its 
activities became a central focus of the SC’s counter-terrorism strategy.  The Sanctions 
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Committee began placing suspected individuals and groups on a Consolidated List that obligated 
states to freeze the listed individuals’ and groups assets.  An individual could be named to the list 
by any state, which was not obligated to provided justification, and, apart from directly 
petitioning the listing state (which was under no obligation to respond) there was no way an 
individual could prove that he or she was not financing terrorism and so be removed from the 
List.  Because the committee targets individuals, a concern for its treatment of those individuals’ 
human rights grew among actors within and outside the UN.  For example, the European Court 
of Justice (later The Court of Justice of the European Union), in the Kadi case (2008), found that 
the list preemptively punished individuals who were only suspected, but not proven, to have 
financed terrorism, breaching their fair trial rights.54  Eventually, responding to numerous 
complaints about this procedure, the committee appointed what it called a “focal point” to 
receive delisting requests.55  There was only one problem:  the focal point was permitted to 
receive petitions, but it had no authority to act on them.   
Moreover, it quickly became apparent that the Consolidated List was subject to abuse:  
the fact that there was no way to get oneself removed from the List was apparent when it was 
discovered that some of the listed individuals had died years before and yet remained on the 
list.56  There was no mechanism for judicial review.57  In December 2009, the Security Council 
decided to work toward greater fairness.  It streamlined the delisting procedure, and, in 
accordance with Res. 1904 (2009), began to publish brief “narrative summaries” of reasons for 
placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the List.58  The summaries are prepared 
with the assistance of the committee’s Monitoring Team in coordination with the relevant 
designating States.  They include “the statement of the case, coversheet or any other official 
information provided to the Committee, or any relevant information available publicly from 
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official sources, or any other information provided by the designating State(s) or Committee 
members.”59  The narratives perhaps stand in for the right of the accused to hear the charges 
against him, which could provide the accused the basis for contesting the listing.  However, since 
this is not a court proceeding, the listed persons still have no avenue for legal appeal. 
The Security Council also replaced the focal point with an Ombudsperson who is 
independent of the Sanctions Committee and tasked with interacting with petitioners who make 
delisting requests, as well as with relevant states and organizations.  The Ombudsperson then 
reports to the committee.60  In June, 2010, Judge Kimberly Prost was appointed the first 
Ombudsperson.  In her first press conference on July 15, 2010, Judge Prost reiterated her 
intention to be independent and fair, but still noted that “Sanctions isn’t a legal committee. There 
is no due process. The [listing and delisting procedures] don’t have the same measures as legal 
processes.” She sees her role as addressing this issue: “There are problems with fairness,” she 
said, “let’s address those through this new office.”61  By July, 2010, she had set up a stand-alone 
website, public email address and simple, straightforward submission and review procedures for 
petitioners seeking delisting.62  Still, it remains to be seen whether this more transparent process 
will be effective, in the absence of regular judicial review.  As of June, 2011, some 500 names 
remained on the Consolidated List, and it should be noted that the Obama administration has 
worked to weaken efforts to integrate judicial review into the process.63   
 
Conclusion 
Juxtaposing the history of the Sanctions Committee next to that of CTC, it seems evident 
that, while both have moved in the direction of greater concern for human rights, CTC has 
integrated this concern more thoroughly into his operations.  By July, 2010, when CTC reported 
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to the Security Council on its recent work, it claimed to have completely adopted the standards 
outlined in the Policy Guidance and in the High Commissioner’s remarks.64  CTC’s report to the 
Security Council on December 7, 2010 surveyed its human rights work as part of its three-year 
funding review.65  The document asserts that human rights is raised “routinely” with states at 
every level, during “country visits, workshops, videoconferences and other exchanges,” and that 
CTC now works routinely with the Sanctions Committee to plan regional workshops to help 
States “lacking the capacity to submit responses” as required (5). 
 All this is a far cry from where the committee started in 2001.  Yet the big question 
remains:  does any of this activity produce positive outcomes for states’ observance of human 
rights in counter-terrorism?  Unfortunately, the answer cannot yet be assessed because 
CTC/CTED’s work products—the PIAs, stock-taking exercises, records of technical assistance, 
and accounts of state visits—are still not publicly accessible.   Given that CTC has no recourse to 
sanctions, it is unclear what follows when the committee determines that a given state could do 
more to implement a particular measure. Do states file a new report in response to the PIA, and is 
their report taken into account in the stock-taking exercise?  The country visits are similarly 
mysterious:  there are no guidelines to suggest how the visiting team interacts with state officials 
on these issues, what the senior human rights officer's role is, and to what extent the human 
rights observations made by the visiting team are incorporated into the PIA and stock-taking 
exercise.  There is still no way of determining whether, in general, the process has led to 
substantive corrections on human rights issues, and if so, whether there is a pattern in the types 
of human rights that states have been most and least willing to address.  While secrecy may in 
some instances be necessary in order for states to deal in good faith on sensitive issues, it must 
be balanced against the human rights requirement of transparency.   
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 While the committee’s proceedings are confidential, it is still possible to identify some 
indirect measures of the influence of Res. 1373 on human rights.  The Human Rights 
Committee’s Concluding Observations in response to country reports often shed light on the 
state’s compliance with human rights in counter-terrorism efforts.  For example, in its 2010 
Concluding Observations on Israel’s most recent country report, the Human Rights Committee 
asserts that “measures designed to counter acts of terrorism, whether adopted in connection with 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) or in the context of the ongoing armed conflict, should 
be in full conformity with the Covenant.”66  The HRC goes on to suggest five concrete steps that 
Israel should undertake to ensure conformity. 
Similarly, in its observations on New Zealand’s report, it asserts that, “While noting the 
obligations imposed under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), the Committee expresses 
concern at the compatibility of some provisions of [New Zealand’s] Terrorism Suppression 
Amendment Act 2007 with the Covenant.”  It also tracks New Zealand’s record with respect to 
Res. 1267, recommending that the state “should take steps to ensure that the measures taken to 
implement Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) as well as the national designation 
procedures for terrorist groups fully comply with all the legal safeguards enshrined in article 14 
of the Covenant.”67  Again, in commenting on San Marino’s counter-terrorism wire tapping law, 
HRC tries to limit the scope of 1373, recommending that “the State party should ensure that its 
counter-terrorism measures, whether taken in connection with Security Council resolution 1373 
(2001) or otherwise, are in full conformity with the Covenant and in particular that the legislation 
adopted in this context is limited to crimes that would justify being characterized as terrorist.”68  
The committee often refers offending states to its General Comment No. 29 on derogation during 
states of emergency.69  These are just a few of the many examples in which HRC has both 
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acknowledged the compulsory nature of 1373 and attempted to limit the negative impact on 
human rights.  To the extent that such comments are necessary, they indirectly bear on the limits 
of CTC’s human rights program.  In a similar way, reactions against 1373’s procedures by 
regional organizations and courts reflect a broader effort to ensure that the Security Council will 
respect the norm of mutual reinforcement.70   
While CTC’s evolving human rights approach is imperfect and requires the proper 
qualifications and demurrals, it nonetheless reflects a sea change at the Security Council, an 
evolution that cannot be restricted, in future, to the narrow field of counter-terrorism.  From this 
point on, it will be more difficult for a sitting member to claim that concern for human rights is 
alien to the Security Council's mission.  Seventy years after its establishment, the Council has, in 
effect, become a human rights body.  From that standpoint, the sustained international backlash 
against the Bush administration's "War on Terror" strengthened human rights. 
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